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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2358 
_____________ 
 
DEBRA A. STEELE, 
         Appellant  
 
v. 
 
PELMOR LABORATORIES INC.  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 2-14-cv-05340) 
District Judge:  Hon. Legrome D. Davis 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 3, 2016 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENBERG, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  March 4, 2016) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Debra A. Steele appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment against her and in favor of 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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her employer, Pelmor Laboratories, Inc. (“Pelmor”).  Steele brought two claims against 
Pelmor: first, that Pelmor discriminated against her on the basis of her sex because it did 
not consider her for a promotion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”); and second, that Pelmor violated 
the Equal Pay Act by failing to pay her the same as a male colleague who did receive that 
promotion.  Because the District Court properly granted summary judgment, we will 
affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 A. Factual Background1 
 Pelmor manufactures rubber parts for the aerospace, computer, and medical device 
industries, employing roughly thirty people.  Steele was hired in 1991 for the position of 
a “trimmer/inspector” at a wage of $7.35 per hour.  Throughout her years at Pelmor, she 
has risen through the ranks.  After spending nine years in the trimming department 
(where she was promoted twice), Steele was promoted to the supervisory position of 
production manager in 2000.  She continues in that role to this day, and makes $67,000 
per year.  Although she dropped out of high school after the ninth grade,2 she has 
                                              
 1 As we are obligated to do in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we 
recount the facts in the light most favorable to Steele, the non-moving party.  Frank C. 
Pollara Grp., LLC v. Ocean View Inv. Holding, LLC, 784 F.3d 177, 179 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
 
2 While Steele testified in her deposition that she dropped out of high school after 
completing the ninth grade, in her 1991 job application she indicated that she had 
completed the tenth grade.  We credit her recent testimony. 
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attended many training programs and she succeeded in obtaining a General Educational 
Development (“GED”) certificate.   
 As production manager, Steele’s responsibilities include (in her words) “mak[ing] 
sure production [is] running efficiently and smoothly.”  (App. at 279a.)  She supervises 
various departments at Pelmor, including the molding, trimming, extrusion, and paint 
departments, and she ensures that the employees in those departments have the materials 
they need to complete their assigned projects.  Her duties are primarily administrative: 
she prepares work schedules, documents customer delivery needs, and orders any 
components that might be missing from Pelmor’s inventory, all with the ultimate goal of 
“coordinat[ing] everything to meet the customer delivery date.”  (App. at 283a.) 
 In June of 2012, Pelmor hired Michael Wuensche – the employee who would 
eventually receive the promotion that Steele wanted – to work as its Controller.  
Wuensche graduated from college in 1980 with a Bachelor of Science degree “in 
commerce with a major in accounting.”  (App. at 518a.)  Thereafter, he obtained a 
master’s degree in business administration from La Salle University with a concentration 
in finance.  Prior to joining Pelmor, Wuensche had years of experience in finance, 
accounting, and management.  He had also started his own company, consulted for a 
number of companies, and, in the job he had just before joining Pelmor, worked as the 
chief financial officer of a company that imported and distributed medical uniforms.  As 
Controller at Pelmor, Wuensche was responsible for the daily management of the 
accounting department.  He was hired by the President of the company, James Ross.   
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 Steele’s immediate supervisor, the company’s Vice President of Operations 
(“VP”), resigned in August 2012.  With the VP position vacant, Ross took over the 
responsibilities of the position.  He testified that, at the time the VP position was vacated, 
he had no intention to hire an external candidate to fill the job.  That was consistent with 
the typical hiring practice at Pelmor.  When promoting to supervisory or management 
positions, Pelmor generally looked within the company.  Those internal hiring decisions 
were usually made without posting or advertising the open position.  Pelmor’s human 
resources manager testified that, since she joined the company in 1994, only a single 
position had been advertised on an internal bulletin board.  In fact, Steele came to occupy 
her position as production manager without any notification to employees that there was 
an available management position and that anyone who was interested could apply.   
 Steele testified that Ross told her there would be no replacement hired for the VP 
position.  But she suspected otherwise.  In July 2013, she thought that Wuensche was 
under consideration for the VP position because he began to get more involved in 
production issues.  In Steele’s words, Wuensche had started to “tell [her] how to do 
things.”  (App. at 308a.)  Her suspicions were so strong that, on July 25, 2013, Steele 
went to the EEOC with the intention of filing a discrimination charge because she felt she 
was being overlooked for the VP position.  At that time, Steele was told that she did not 
have enough information to support a claim of discrimination.  Although Steele suspected 
that Ross was considering putting Wuensche in the job, and even though she went so far 
as to approach the EEOC about filing a discrimination charge, she never conveyed her 
interest in the VP position to Ross or anyone else at the company.   
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 Steele’s suspicions proved correct.  Pelmor promoted Wuensche to the VP 
position effective November 12, 2013.  As president of the company, Ross made the 
decision.  Ross testified that he compared Wuensche to the other possible candidates “in 
[his] head” and determined that he was the best qualified.  (App. at 492a.)  He opted 
against an external search because he did not want the expense of the search process 
through a recruiter.  Ross had worked very closely with Wuensche since hiring him, and 
Wuensche had demonstrated “his ability to learn very quickly, his high level of energy, 
his passion for the industry and his overall strategic thinking … .”  (App. at 491a.)  
Although Ross briefly considered Steele for the job, he concluded that she did not 
possess the necessary skill set – “[h]er communication skills, her managerial skills, her 
work experience, her background, primarily.”  (App. at 493a.)  Ross also specified that he 
“wanted someone with more of an educational background,” though he noted that 
Steele’s limited education alone did not foreclose her chance at the promotion.  (App. at 
495a.)  Ross expressed concern that Steele lacked the ability “to strategically think about 
the company and the business and the industry we play in,” particularly because her 
current role was “sort of micro level” while he was looking for “more of a macro 
thinker.”  (App. at 494a.)  He described Steele’s overall job performance as “below 
average” (App. at 493a), but not “poor enough to warrant her being terminated” (App. at 
495a).3 
                                              
3 Pelmor’s human resources manager testified that Steele performed 
“adequate[ly]” until Wuensche made certain changes to her position.  (App. at 358a.)  For 
his part, Wuensche described Steele’s work as “[m]arginal” and “[n]ot to the standard … 
that warrants advancement within the organization.”  (App. at 522a.) 
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 Upon his promotion, Wuensche received an increase in salary.  When he started at 
Controller he made $80,000 per year.  At the time of his deposition, he made $115,000 
per year.  In his current role as VP, Wuensche continues to perform the job 
responsibilities of the Controller and now also works as Steele’s immediate supervisor.  
 B. Procedural Background 
 Steele returned to the EEOC and was issued a right to sue letter.  She then filed her 
complaint against Pelmor, alleging that she was denied the promotion because of her sex, 
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the PHRA.  She also claims 
that Pelmor violated the Equal Pay Act because its “employees of the opposite sex were 
paid differently for performing ‘equal work’ or work of substantially equal skill, effort 
and responsibility, under similar working conditions.”  (App. at 31a.)  After a period of 
discovery, Pelmor moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted.  This 
timely appeal followed. 
II. DISCUSSION4 
We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment and, like the 
District Court, must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.  
Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 2006).  Summary judgment is 
only appropriate if Pelmor can establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact” and it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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A. Steele’s Sex Discrimination Claim 
Steele alleges that Pelmor violated Title VII and the PHRA in discriminating 
against her on the basis of sex when it promoted Wuensche instead of her.  Although she 
relies on two distinct statutory bases, we consider her claims of sex discrimination 
together under the same standard, as “[c]laims under the PHRA are interpreted 
coextensively with Title VII claims.”  Atkinson, 460 F.3d at 454 n.6. 
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex in their 
hiring decisions.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).  To prevail on a Title VII claim, Steele 
must satisfy the familiar burden-shifting inquiry under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).  That inquiry proceeds in three steps.  First, Steele 
must establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in Pelmor’s decision to not 
promote her.  To do so, she must show that “(a) she was a member of a protected class, 
(b) she was qualified for the [position] to which she applied, and (c) another, not in the 
protected class, was treated more favorably.”  Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock University 
State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 2006).  If she succeeds in meeting 
those elements, the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework shifts the burden 
of production to Pelmor to establish a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its failure 
to promote her.  Id.  If it can do so, the third step requires that Steele show that the 
proffered reason is a mere pretext for sex discrimination.  Id.  Although the burden of 
production shifts, the employee always has the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove 
discrimination.  Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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The District Court held that Steele had satisfied the elements of a prima facie case 
and, in its briefing here, Pelmor does not challenge that conclusion.  Similarly, Steele 
does not dispute that Pelmor proffered a non-discriminatory reason for its decision to 
promote Wuensche, namely that Wuensche was better qualified for the position.  Given 
the lack of any dispute at the initial two steps of the inquiry, we proceed directly to 
consideration of whether Steele has met her burden to show that Pelmor’s stated reason 
for its promotion decision – Wuensche’s superior qualifications – was a pretext for sex 
discrimination. 
To establish pretext, and thus defeat summary judgment when an employer has 
responded with a non-discriminatory reason for its decision, the employee “must point to 
some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either 
(1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an 
invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative 
cause of the employer’s action.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Because the employee must demonstrate that the employer was motivated by a 
discriminatory animus, it is not enough to show that the employer’s decision was “wrong 
or mistaken.”  Id. at 765.  Instead, the employee has the burden to “demonstrate such 
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the 
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could 
rationally find them unworthy of credence.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Steele advances two arguments in her effort to demonstrate pretext.  She first 
contends that she has provided “statistical evidence of pretext.”  (Opening Br. at 18.)  The 
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evidence she cites is the single fact that the VPs at Pelmor – there have been three over 
time – have been men.  She contends that a “population of three” is “certainly significant 
in a smaller company with less than formal hiring practices.”  (Opening Br. at 18.)   
Although “[s]tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an 
important role as one indirect indicator” of discrimination, Mayor of City of Phila. v. 
Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974), such raw numerical comparisons as 
Steele offers here are of limited utility, absent “any analysis of either the qualified 
applicant pool or the flow of qualified candidates over a relevant time period,” Ezold v. 
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 543 (3d Cir. 1992).  The usefulness of 
statistical evidence in proving discrimination “depends on all of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances,” Int’l Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977), but 
the record here says nothing about the facts and circumstances surrounding the hiring of 
the three past male Vice Presidents.  Even if it did, such evidence would be of 
questionable strength in establishing any sort of pattern of discriminatory conduct.  See 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 (1988) (“[S]tatistical disparities 
must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of causation.”).  Without 
any evidence related to the hiring of three past Vice Presidents, particularly whether there 
were qualified female candidates who applied for those openings and were denied, we 
must reject Steele’s argument that there is “statistical evidence of pretext.”  (Opening Br. 
at 18.) 
Second, Steele argues that she was not given a “fair shake” because she was 
qualified for the position but was never given the chance to apply for it.  (Id.)  Even 
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accepting that contention as true, there is no evidence to show that the lack of a formal 
hiring process had anything to do with Steele’s gender.  The record is devoid of any 
direct evidence of discrimination in the promotion decision.  Steele testified that she had 
never seen any documents to support her claim, that no one had ever told her she was 
denied the promotion because of her gender, and that she thus had no facts or evidence to 
support her claim other than her “gut feeling.”  (App. at 322a.)  She conceded that the 
only basis for her claim of sex discrimination was that Wuensche is a man and she is a 
woman.  Nor does Steele allege that her past treatment by Pelmor evidenced any 
discriminatory animus.  Quite the contrary: Steele was hired in 1991 and has been 
promoted repeatedly.  The record also reflects that the absence of an internal posting or 
advertisement of the position within the company was consistent with Pelmor’s typical 
hiring practices.  Indeed, that was how Steele herself got her last promotion. 
Having reviewed her complaint, briefing, and deposition, it is apparent that Steele 
believes that she is better qualified than Wuensche for the job of VP at Pelmor.  But that 
is not her decision to make.  “[M]ore than a denial of promotion as a result of a dispute 
over qualifications must be shown to prove pretext.”  Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 
F.2d 154, 170 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Even “[t]he fact that a 
court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicant does not 
in itself expose him to Title VII liability … .”  Ezold, 983 F.2d at 531 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Rather, to demonstrate pretext, Steele must show “that the qualifications 
of the person actually promoted were so much lower than those of h[is] competitors that a 
reasonable factfinder could disbelieve the claim that the employer was honestly seeking 
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the best qualified candidate.”  Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 999 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(Alito, J., dissenting).  In the absence of such a significant degree of difference in 
qualifications that may arouse a suspicion of discrimination, we defer to the employer’s 
hiring decisions, as Title VII “was not intended to diminish traditional management 
prerogatives.”  Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Steele cannot credibly claim that she is more qualified than Wuensche to the 
overwhelming extent required for her to prove pretext.  He has a college degree and 
MBA; she has a high school equivalency degree.  He has significant managerial 
experience in a variety of manufacturing contexts; she has longer experience in the 
company but not in high-level managerial positions.  Ross testified that he compared the 
two of them, albeit informally, and came to the conclusion that Wuensche was better 
qualified for the position than Steele, given his strength as a strategic thinker, knowledge 
of the overall industry, and ability to learn quickly.  “[A] company has the right to make 
business judgments on employee status, particularly when the decision involves 
subjective factors deemed essential to certain positions.”  Ezold, 983 F.2d at 527 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Because Steele has the ultimate burden to prove intentional discrimination, Jones, 
198 F.3d at 410, her “gut feeling” cannot substitute for actual evidence.  (App. at 322a.)  
Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Pelmor 
on her claims of sex discrimination under Title VII and the PHRA. 
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B. Steele’s Equal Pay Act Claim 
Steele next alleges that Pelmor violated the Equal Pay Act by paying Wuensche 
more than her.  The Equal Pay Act prohibits gender-based discrimination in rates of pay 
to employees, requiring equal pay for equal work.5  Claims under the Equal Pay Act 
follow a two-step burden-shifting paradigm.  The plaintiff must first 
establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that employees of the 
opposite sex were paid differently for performing “equal work” – work of 
substantially equal skill, effort and responsibility, under similar working 
conditions.  The burden of persuasion then shifts to the employer to 
demonstrate the applicability of one of the four affirmative defenses 
specified in the Act. 
 
Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). 
 
 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Pelmor because it 
concluded that Wuensche and Steele do not perform substantially equal work.  We agree.  
“The crucial finding on the equal work issue is whether the jobs to be compared have a 
‘common core’ of tasks, i.e., whether a significant portion of the two jobs is identical.”  
Brobst v. Columbus Servs. Int’l, 761 F.2d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1985).  Factors to be 
considered in determining whether tasks are similar include whether they require similar 
                                              
5 The text of the Equal Pay Act provides, in pertinent part: 
 
No employer ... shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex 
by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he 
pays wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the 
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and 
which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such 
payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) 
a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or 
(iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex ... . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 206(d). 
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quality and quantity of production, education, relevant prior work experience, conduct, 
and skill.  29 C.F.R. § 1620.13.  Steele testified during her deposition that she is the only 
person at Pelmor who does the tasks that she does.  She supervises different employees 
than Wuensche, works a different shift, and is responsible for a unique part of the 
company’s operations.  The fact that Wuensche may step in and perform Steele’s duties 
when she is sick or on vacation does not indicate a substantial overlap in their job 
responsibilities.  Wuensche is Steele’s immediate supervisor.  In his words, he has “direct 
management of the managers.”  (App. at 521a.)  He also continues to perform the duties 
of his prior position as Controller, running the accounting department.   
 Steele had the benefit of significant discovery – she deposed the company 
president, human resources manager, and Wuensche himself.  That testimony has 
revealed, essentially, that Wuensche is Steele’s boss.  And it is not discriminatory for 
Pelmor to pay Steele less than her boss.  Given the dissimilarity in their job 
responsibilities, Steele cannot make a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, and the 
District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Pelmor.6 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
                                              
6 Although Steele also suggests in her complaint that Pelmor retaliated against her 
after she filed her EEOC complaint by giving her negative performance reviews – thus (at 
least impliedly) raising a retaliation claim – she has advanced no argument concerning 
retaliation before this Court.  Thus, any such claim is deemed waived.  See Albrecht v. 
Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 113 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007) (“An issue that is not discussed in the briefs 
is waived.”). 
